Speech: Responding to Emergencies - from Management to Leadership

Lianne Dalziel

AUT University Inaugural National Emergency Management Research Forum, Auckland

The timing of today’s inaugural National Emergency Management Research Forum could not be better. Two weeks ago to the day, the government released the first independent review of the Civil Defence & Emergency Management (CDEM) response to the February 22 earthquake.

To be able to participate in a Forum where Graduate Certificate and Post Graduate students in Emergency Management are presenting their research projects in the wake of such a report is an excellent opportunity for me to encourage you in your research and study.

You may not have been aware that this report had been released. Unfortunately the government chose a Friday during the recess, which pretty much guarantees limited media coverage and no immediate Parliamentary scrutiny.

This report is too important to be buried. It is an enormously valuable resource not only for a government determined to learn the lessons of Christchurch and improve our response capability in the future, but also for students and researchers, who will advance the body of knowledge the world relies on as the scale and consequences of disasters become increasingly severe. Many of today’s presentations are on issues that are referenced in the report.

One thing we know from all the evidence and backed up by this report is the need for community engagement. The stronger the relationships that pre-exist a disaster, the more engaged the community is in the response and the recovery.

I believe the government should have referred this report with its 108 recommendations not to the Ministry, but rather to the wider community to obtain feedback before making any decisions, but especially the decision to rule out two of their six most important recommendations. There is always a risk with top down decision-making that the local knowledge of the people, the experience of the practitioners and the evidence-base of the researchers gets overlooked. The risk is that decisions are made by people acting with goodwill, but misinformed as to best practice.

The report provides such an example, where the decision was taken during the response to ban social science researchers from interviewing people affected by the earthquake. It was done to avoid extra stress for people, which was a good motive, but actually caused the loss of valuable information that could have been used for research purposes in order to improve response in the future, not just in New Zealand but the rest of the world as well.

The report identified how unusual this ban was in world terms, which raises questions about how New Zealand’s response will be viewed internationally.

And if there had been a desire to avoid placing extra stress on people by being approached about their situation, then it would have been better focused on addressing the manner in which a multiplicity of official and unofficial calls were made on people, asking if help was needed, but failing to capture and share any information to allow for a coordinated response to identified need. It is an example of acting with the best of intentions but with no knowledge of effective practice.

There are two things that a city like Christchurch can ask of a disaster such as the one we have experienced.

The first is that its legacy is a more sustainable, resilient and connected city, not only in terms of people and communities, but also in terms of our social, cultural, economic, built and natural environments, based on genuine partnerships with all levels of government. This is an opportunity to address some of our city’s pre-existing vulnerabilities in each of those areas.

The second is that we learn the lessons of what has occurred in Christchurch. This requires complete transparency and integrity. It is not about blame-seeking; it is about understanding what worked, what didn’t, and learning from that.

The review’s six major recommendations are:

That while territorial local authorities should continue to be able to declare a state of emergency the responsibility for leading and controlling the response should rest solely with CDEM Groups.
That a small cadre of personnel be established to lead in senior emergency management positions during natural disasters, that they be highly trained in catastrophic event management (including staff and command training from NZDF and Police) and that they be drawn from CDEM groups and public and private sector organisations.
That new structures be developed to modify CIMS to better link the Response with the community and community organisations, and a formal project be undertaken in Christchurch, led by community groups participating in the Response, to develop templates to optimise the use of such volunteers.
That the preservation of business and jobs be made an objective of the Response, that CDEM planning and EOCs take this fully into account in their planning and their activities, and that a strong link with business be established within EOCs.
That at the time that the whole‐of‐government response is reviewed, consideration be given to MCDEM being located within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet so as to provide a better platform for launching responses.
That MCDEM continue to promote a culture of preparedness for major disasters amongst all sectors and is resourced appropriately to do so.

As I said these were among the 108 recommendations that this thorough analysis of the official and unofficial response produced.

It is a powerful report backed up by a bibliography that would have been a good starting point for the myriad of Treasury, MED & DPMC policy advisers who developed the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery framework without reference to the recovery chapter of the National CDEM Plan or any of the international literature that informs best practice in recovery.

As I said two of these six main recommendations have already been ruled out.

The first of the rejected recommendations was that the responsibility for leading and controlling the response should rest solely with the regional CDEM Groups.

Why would this be ruled out? It was made clear in the report that the duplication of control and Emergency Operations Centres between Christchurch city and the regional CDEM group was not only inefficient but also put people and property at risk. And that under existing legislation the same situation could arise in a number of different parts of New Zealand.

This is not the case in Wellington. They have already given effect to this recommendation before it was made. In July this year each territorial authority in the Wellington region ceded its individual role to a strengthened collective role, which is precisely the template that the review envisioned.

Here is a quote from the Wellington Region Emergency Management Office (WREMO) website:

"The new Wellington Region Emergency Management Office (WREMO) was launched on 2 July 2012 to manage Civil Defence Emergency Management services in support of the nine City, District, and Regional Councils of the Wellington region.

This is an important development as disasters don’t abide by territorial boundaries and many of our people live in one part of the region and work in another. A shared approach to emergency management will enable our communities to be better prepared and will provide an ability to share resources to best effect. … This significant change sees Emergency Management restructured to provide two vital roles:

Building resilient communities; and,
Building and maintaining the structures, systems and teams that will enable our community to respond and recover from disasters."

The change follows on from a Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management assessment in 2010 of the region's disaster-response capability. The assessment found that there were issues with the coordination of emergency management across the region.

So given that Wellington received this advice and this was how it responded, why has the government ruled out addressing the very same issue in exactly the same way for the regions that are exposing their communities to wasteful duplication and risks to people and property?

And why did the Cabinet paper recommend that rather than diminish the role of territorial authorities CDEM will work with the regional CDEM groups that need strengthening? If the problem lay with the regional CDEM groups (which are afterall made up of the territorial authorities), then why did the independent review recommend that the regional CDEM groups take over that role? And isn’t it odd that the Wellington territorial authorities came to exactly the same conclusion as the expert review team?

So what’s the difference between Canterbury and Wellington? Interestingly every Mayor and Chief Executive in the Wellington region contributes to the regional CDEM group. This is not the case in Canterbury with three of the nine councils having delegated the role to a councillor, including the largest, Christchurch. The only Council whose Chief Executive delegated his role was Christchurch. Neither the Mayor nor the Chief Executive took up those roles after the September earthquake.

This raises the question of leadership. We know that a culture of an organisation is framed by its leadership and in Christchurch we saw a ‘business as usual’ approach after September, which the literature confirms is anathema to recovery.

I cannot help but reflect how much better prepared Christchurch City would have been if the Mayor and the Chief Executive had a better understanding of the council’s role after a major disaster and if both of them had elevated their role within the regional CDEM group after the September quake.

This is not a criticism. My comments are designed to seek solutions.

That’s why I have chosen to contrast what Wellington has done. Their Mission Statement says “Your Region Needs You: Empowering communities to build the resilience and continuity necessary so that the region is prepared to respond to and recover from natural and man-made emergencies”. And here are the measures they have established:

In 3 years when someone asks us how we increased the resilience of the Wellington … (this is what they will be able to say)….

Our communities are connected
We engage and empower existing social structures in our communities
We enable channels of communication for communities to link into resources
Our communities have realistic expectations of the levels of support available during an event
Our public and private sectors are prepared to recover from an event and return to business quickly
Our councils own and understand their role in emergency management
We help reduce the impacts of the hazards across the region
We have strong and honest partnerships throughout our region.

This is the way it is supposed to be.

I just hope that the government will think again about the gravity of the ‘doing nothing’ option and where the next set of risks may be exposed. This is too important to be swept under the carpet.

The other recommendation they have rejected is the one that would move MCDEM from the Department of Internal Affairs to the Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet. There is an element of symbolism in this proposal and it is also to do with leadership. I did the same as Minister of Commerce when I recommended that the Regulatory Impact Analysis Unit shift from the Ministry of Economic Development to Treasury. It sent a powerful message to all departments about the weight our government placed on quality regulatory impact analysis - this of itself helped improve performance, as did the greater influence Treasury had to hold departments to account for their analysis.

The same would be true here. However given that ODESC – the Officials Committee for Domestic &External Security Co-ordination - will always be engaged in a major emergency – whether or not it is a local, regional or national emergency – it also makes practical sense to elevate MCDEM to this level. The Minister’s advice to government that the reviewers were concerned only with the lack of recognition of MCDEM’s role in a major emergency reinforces the very problem the review team tried to address.

The cabinet paper says: “In MCDEM’s experience with the response, agencies that were unfamiliar with civil defence arrangements did not always recognise that MCDEM was the lead agency with an overall management responsibility that they needed to engage with”.

The Minister, who is outside Cabinet, suggests that this can be mitigated by increasing other agencies’ awareness of the lead role of MCDEM. Having the Minister outside Cabinet is actually part of the problem. But essentially what has been identified is the failure to embed a fully integrated response capability within the state sector as a whole, and a means for the wider community to plug into the response with its own networks, resources, knowledge and expertise.

The remaining four recommendations which are supported are subject to a similar form of shorthand which fails to capture the essence of the solutions this highly expert panel has offered. The government has agreed to

Explore options for a cadre of highly trained managers to enhance the ability of local authorities and CDEM groups to control large-scale emergency responses;
Link emergency response systems (for example, guidelines & protocols) more closely with communities;
Review arrangements to ensure a higher priority is given to preserving businesses and jobs following a major event; and
Continue to promote a culture of preparedness for major emergencies amongst all sectors (community, business and government).

All of these and the remainder of the 108 recommendations will be wrapped up in a Corrective Action Plan by the end of next month – all without reference back to any of the affected communities, the experts in the field or the regional CDEM groups.

Again this is not a criticism – it is a reflection on the sense of another lost opportunity.

I don’t feel if anyone outside the affected Christchurch communities and the people who work with them on a daily basis truly understands what is happening to people in terms of their state of mind which can range from abject despair to incandescent rage, with every emotion in-between dependent on their situation. In relatively unaffected parts of the city and certainly in other parts of the country, there are those who cannot understand why people are not just getting on with their lives and accepting the situation for what it is.

We need something that unifies the country around Christchurch’s recovery; and I believe that can only come when people can see what is actually happening. That is why your research is so important. It will help build understanding.

But that means the research and reports such as the independent review need to be received with an open mind.

People who offer criticism are often told that they are reflecting on the genuine efforts of the hardworking USAR teams and the infrastructure workforce who have responded magnificently.

This is unacceptable. There is no question that people did their best. But that cannot be used as an excuse to not to honestly review what occurred so improvements can be made.

Disasters always present opportunities to develop resilience, but denying the real hardship that many still experience, will not allow that to occur.

The trauma inflicted by these earthquakes and aftershocks has for some been severe. Layer on top of that a 6-figure loss of equity in your home. Layer on that the need to live with a zoning decision you don’t understand and can’t take to court even if you could afford to. Layer on that living in what looks like a war-zone and the health effects of the liquefaction under your house. Layer on that ongoing battles with EQC, the apportionment process and insurers, who can go from rebuild to repair in a blink of an eye. Layer on that the impending loss of your community as you or they move. Layer on that a shake-up of the schools that have been the main-stay of stability and normality for your kids.

This is what life is like for thousands of Christchurch residents.

No one denies that this isn’t the most significant event New Zealand has faced. But research-based evidence tells us that this is not the best that we can do.

The only way we can improve our approach to recovery is to look at the evidence, as the Wellington region has done, and use the reports into what has occurred and research to point us in the right direction.

This makes your commitment extremely valuable and as a Christchurch resident I thank you for what you are doing.